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Abstract
Empirical studies of intergenerational transfers usually …nd that bequests
are equally divided among heirs while inter vivos gifts tend to be compen-
satory. Using the HRS data set from the U.S. we …nd that only 5 % of
parents who give, divide their gifts equally among their children. Estimat-
ing probit models, using family panels, we…nd that gifts are compensatory
in the sense that a child is more likely to receive a gift if she works fewer
hours and has lower earnings than than her brothers and sisters. These re-
sults carry over to the amounts given. Fixed e¤ects Tobit estimations show
that the fewer hoursa childworks and thelower her incomeis, themorethe
parents give. Gifts are compensatory. The empirical results are, therefore,
consistent with the predictions of the altruistic model of intergenerational
transfers.
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Empirical studies of intergenerational transfers show that post mortem bequests
are equally divided among heirs while inter vivos gifts tend to be compensatory.1
The di¤erence between actual bequest and gift behavior is a puzzle since estab-
lished models of intergenerational transfers predict that there should be no di¤er-
ence.2 Altruistic parents will make compensatory transfers, regardless of whether
the transfer is inter vivos or post mortem.3
There are several recent papers studying inter vivos gifts. Dunn and Phillips
(1997) …nd, using U.S. data, that gifts are compensatory in the sense that higher
earnings of a child makes a gift less likely. They use data from the Asset and
Health Dynamics among the Oldest Old (AHEAD).4
In this paper we study data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).5
The HRS has been designed and conducted by the University of Michigan’s Sur-
vey Research Center. It focuses on health and retirement related issues of the
U.S. population. It is a panel data set, surveying a sample of the preretirement
population (cohorts born between 1931 and 1941), which was launched in 1992
and is repeated biennually. In this study we focus on the 1992 wave.6
Theobjective ofthis paper is to…nd out empirically what explainstheobserved
pattern of giving. An important question is if gifts are compensatory, i.e., if
parents give more to a child with less resources of her own than her brothers and
sisters.
The HRS is a good data set to study questions addressed in our paper. The
coverage of the pre-retirement cohort includes those who have accumulated sub-
stantial wealth from life cycle savings. They are, therefore, in a position where
1Most empirical studies of estate division …nd equal division; see Menchik (1980, 1988) and
Wilhelm (1996) for the U.S. and Arrondel et al. (1997) for France. Tomes (1981, 1988), however,
…nds that bequests are compensatory.
2See also the surveys by Laitner (1997) and Masson and Pestieau (1997).
3Cremer and Pestieau (1996), in a model of altruistic parents facing moral hazard and the
samaritan’s dilemma, generate the prediction that gifts are equal and bequests are compensatory.
Lundholm and Ohlsson (2000) assume that gifts are private information while bequests are public
information and that parents care about their reputation after death. Given these assumptions
altrustic parents will choose compensatory gifts and equal bequests.
4Some other empirical papers on gifts are Altonji et al. (1992), Altonji et al. (1997), Arrondel
and Laferrère (1998), Arrondel and Wol¤ (1998), Cox (1987), Cox and Rank (1992), Cox et al.
(1997), Guiso and Jappelli (1991), Poterba (1997), and Poterba (1998).
5McGarry and Schoeni (1995) use data from the HRS while McGarry (1998, 1999) combine
the HRS and the AHEAD.
6The HRS web site at <http://www.umich.edu/»hrswww> is the main source of informa-
tion. Public release data …les are available for the 1992 wave (fully cleaned and imputed) and the
1994 wave (partly cleaned and imputed). The sample is not representative. African Americans,
Hispanics and Florida residents are oversampled.
1they can a¤ord to give away money. Moreover, as they are about to retire within
the foreseeable future, they make conscious decisions about how to use the accu-
mulated resources.
Two important features of our analysis are, …rst, that we—in contrast to most
other studies—focus on data on the level of the recipients (children) rather than
data on the level of the donors (parents). Second, the child level data permit us
to use econometric methods for panel data.
Conditional on giving at all, we …nd that only 5 % of parents in the HRS data
set divide their gifts equally among their children. Equal sharing is decreasing
in the number of children, 10 % of the parents with two children share equally
while less than 1 % of the parents with 5 children or more give the same amounts.
Allowing some intrafamily variation, 7.6 % of the parents give amounts to each
child in the interval § 20 % from the intrafamily mean.
Our main result is that the empirical …ndings suggest that gifts are compen-
satory. This is consistent with the predictions of the altruistic model of intergen-
erational transfers.
Estimating probit models, using family panels, we …nd that gifts are compen-
satory in the sense that a child is more likely to receive a gift if she works fewer
hours and has lower income than than her brothers and sisters.
These results carry over to the amounts given. Estimations of …xed and ran-
dom e¤ects models, conditional on positive family gift amounts, and …xed e¤ect
Tobit estimations show that the fewer hours a child works and the lower her
income is, the more the parents give.
The paper is structured as follows: The testable predictions from competing
theoretical models of intergenerational transfersare discussedin Section 2. Section
3 describes the HRS sample. We give some general information and summary
statistics for keyvariables. We alsogive somesummary statisticsontheestimating
sample and descriptions of the variable de…nitions in Appendix A. The estimates
for a probit model (family level), a random e¤ects probit model, …xed andrandom
e¤ects conditional amount models, and a …xed e¤ects Tobit model are reported in
Section4. Appendix B reports corresponding estimations ona subsample. Section
5 concludes.
2. Theoretical framework
Gifts are voluntary intergenerational transfers. Di¤erent theoretical models of
voluntary intergenerational transfers have been proposed in the literature:7
7Bequests, on the other hand, may arise accidentally because of imperfect markets for an-
nuities. The accidental model of Davies (1981) is a version of the life-cycle model. Households
cannot insure because of adverse selection in annuities markets. Instead they have to save for a
21. the altruistic model
2. the egoistic model
3. the exchange model
We will discuss these models below. But before doing that there is an impor-
tant quali…cation to be made. Throughout our review of the theoretical models
we will assume that the behavior of those receiving transfers (children) is not
a¤ected by the decisions of those making transfers (parents). Hence, we rule out
any strategic interactions between donors and donees (cf. Cremer and Pestieau,
1996). There will, e.g., be no samaritan’s dilemma in the models discussed.
2.1. The altruistic model
This is the Becker (1974) and Barro (1974) framework.8 Consider a parent who
has two children. The parent’s total earnings is Y p, the childrens earnings are Y c
1
and Y c
2. In the altruistic model, the parent cares about its own consumption, Cp,
and the childrens total resources, Y c
1 +G1 and Y c
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withU(:) andV (:) concaveandincreasingandwithU0(0) = 1 = V 0(0). The price
of consumption is 1. V(:) measures parental utility from a child’s consumption
and ¯ registers the strength of the parent’s altruistic sentiments. Despite the
simplicity of (1)–(3), the behavioral implications seem quite general.
Let Bi = B(Y p;Y c
1;Y c
2;¯);i = 1;2 be the utility maximizing gifts in absence







long retirement. If they die young, their unused resources become accidental bequests. If they
live a long time, they may die with little or no estate. Friedman and Warshawsky (1990) report
rather ambivalent support for the model.
8The presentation is inspired by Laitner and Juster (1996).
3Solving the …rst-order conditions of utility maximization, assuming interior solu-
tions, yields:





The parent will equalize the consumption opportunities of the children. We can
also compute the partial derivatives of the behavioral equations. Higher earnings
for a child reduces the gift it receives. The total resources of the child will,










Higher earnings for the parent lead to more gifts. Similarly, higher earnings for
a sibling also increase the gift. It turns out these two partial derivatives are
identical. What matters is the total resources of the other people in the extended














The partial derivatives can be combined to yield an adding–up condition. If
the parent gains a dollar while a child loses the same amount, a one dollar gift






= 1;i = 1;2
2.2. The egoistic model
Inanother frequently used model (e.g. Blinder, 1974; Hurd, 1989), a parent derives
utility from the amount it gives (joy of giving) but not from the utility the child
actually derives from the resulting transfer. This is sometimes called the egoistic
model. The maximization problem of the parent can be written:
max
Cp;G1;G2
U(Cp)+ ¯V ¤(G1 + G2); (6)
subject to (2) and (3). The partial derivatives of the behavioral functions become:
9Altonji et al. (1997) test this condition.
40 <
@(G1 + G2)
@Y p < 1
There are no di¤erences, compared to the altruistic model, of the e¤ects of
higher earnings for the parent. The models di¤er in the implications of higher
earnings for the children. Behavior according to the egoistic model is not a¤ected
by the earnings of the children.
2.3. The exchange model
Bernheim et al. (1985) and Cox (1987) present versions of the exchange model. In
the exchange model, the parent is not altruistic in the sense of caring about the
consumption possibilities of the children. Instead the parent values the attentions
of the children more than services otherwise purchased in anonymous markets.
Suppose a parent obtains such attentions in proportion to the amounts—Gi =
piCs
i;i = 1;2—it gives to its children. Since the opportunity cost of each child’s
time is increasing in its earnings Y c
i ;i = 1;2, the implicit price the parent pays for
attention, pi, will tend to be increasing in Y c
i ;i = 1;2. The quantity of services
bought from each child is represented by Cs



























2 ¸ 0: (9)
Higher earnings of the parent will tend to result in more gifts but also more own
consumption. The parents’ consumption will respond to changes in income of






Theimpactof the childrens earnings on giftsandtheparents’ ownconsumption
is now, however, in general ambiguous. The signs of the partial derivatives will
depend on the price elasticity of the demand for child services. If it is low enough
5Table 2.1: Theoretically predicted e¤ects on parental gifts to a child.
model parent’s resources child’s own earnings sibling’s earnings
the altruistic model + ¡ +
the egoistic model + 0 0
the exchange model + +a ¡a
a. Provided that the demand elasticity for child services is low enough.
for expenditure to increase when the price increases, e.g., because there are no















The partial derivatives with respect to Y c
2 are analogous.
2.4. Summing up
Table 2.1 summarizes the predictions of the di¤erent gift models. The models all
share the prediction that more resources for the parent will increase the gifts. The
empirical analysis of this variable cannot help us to distinguish between di¤erent
theories. It is, however, a consistency requirement to empirically verify that more
resources for parents result in higher gifts. The theories di¤er on their predictions
of how the child’s earnings a¤ect gifts. Here the empirical analysis can shed light
on the question which model is consistent with the data.






; where V 0
1 is the marginal
utility of consuming C s
1 while V 00
1 is the second derivative of V1(C s
1). If this condition does not
hold the signs are reversed.
63. Descriptive facts
3.1. The survey
The 1992 wave of the HRS comprises information on 7,700 households with 25,000
children. The sampled population is U.S. residents of the pre-retirement cohort
born during 1931-1941 (either family head or spouse), excluding institutionalized
persons households. The core sample aims to be representative, although there
is deliberate oversampling of Blacks, Hispanics, and Florida residents (186:100,
172:100, 200:100, respectively).
There are almost 13,000 respondents. Within a household there are two main
respondent types: the …nancial respondent (primary respondent), who is consid-
ered most knowledgeable of household …nancial matters, and the family respon-
dent who is usually the female member in a couple.
Apart from family structure, transfers the questionnaire covers the demo-
graphic background, health status, housing, employment, last job and job history,
retirement plans, assets and liabilities, income, information on children, and a
number of additional sections, among which experimental modules.
We use information from the parts on demographics, assets, income, family
relations and transfers, and on children. Information on the latter two parts was
provided by the family respondent. It contains data on the number, sex, age,
education etc. of all children of the family, and on inter vivos transfers from
parents to their children during the preceding year.
For the present study, the information on inter vivos transfers is of crucial
importance. The questionnaire asks the following question (questionE35, variable
1504):
(Not counting any shared housing or sharedfood,) Have you [and your
(husband/partner)] given (your child/any of your children) …nancial
assistance totaling $500 or more in the past 12 months?
[DEFINITION: By …nancial assistance we mean giving money, helping
pay bills, or covering speci…c types of costs such as those for medical
care or insurance, schooling, down payment for a home, rent, etc. The
…nancial assistance can be considered support, a gift or a loan.]
We interpret this as gifts. Conditional on the answer being a¢rmative, the
respondent is then asked to give the total amounts transfered, per child.
Thesample we select for the present study includes only families with children.
We lose some, but not many, observations due to some inconsistencies in the data,
and due to missing values in selected variables.
Informationonnet worthis available forall households, althoughit is not quite
clear which observations have been imputed and to which extent imputation error
7Table 3.1: Fraction of households giving and giving equally.
number number of families:
of total giving: equal § 2 % § 5 % § 10 % § 20 %
children % giving from the intrafamily mean
1 651 225 34.6 - - - - -
2 1,745 731 41.9 77 78 82 92 130
3 1,539 615 40.0 23 23 23 23 30
4 1,121 422 37.6 11 11 11 11 11
>4 1,694 535 31.6 4 4 4 4 4
total 6,750 2,528 37.1 115 116 120 133 175
share of those 100.0 5.0 5.0 5.2 5.8 7.6
giving, %a
a. We use sampling weights.
might be an issue. The number of missing observations of children’s income is
due to the fact that this information has only be requested for children not living
at home.
3.2. Descriptive statistics
Table 3.1 cross-tabulates the number of children in the family against the fraction
of parents who have given …nancial assistance. Slightly more than one-third of
parents have made gifts. For families with more than one child, this fraction is
decreasing in the number of children. Conditional on giving anything at all, the
table also shows that 5 % of the parents with more than one child give the same
amount toall children. Equal sharing is decreasingin the numberof children, 10 %
ofthe parents withtwochildren giveequally whileless than1 %ofthe parents with
5 children or more give the same amounts. Allowing some intrafamily variation
7.6 % of the parents give amounts to each child in the interval § 20 % from the
intrafamily mean.
Table 3.2 shows dollar amounts given by parents. In other words, these are
the per family gifts given, not the per child gifts received. Clearly, the amounts
given are decreasing in the number of children. The table also shows that parents
who use equal sharing give more than other parents.
A possible explanation to this is suggested by Table 3.3. Parents giving equal
shares have higher net worth than parents not giving equal shares. There also
seems to exist a positive correlation between family net worth and the probability
that parents will give to their children. Similarly, the total amount spent on
children’s education increases if one restricts the sample to those who give at all,
8Table 3.2: Amounts given.
number of number of
number families amount: families amount:
of giving family mean standard giving family mean standard
children USD deviation equally USD deviation
1 225 4,700 7,033
2 731 3,003 5,599 77 6,141 13,083
3 615 1,923 4,230 23 5,082 16,758
4 422 1,205 1,618 11 1,811 2,903
>4 535 707 974 4 2,010 2,490
total 2,528 2,123 4,474 115 5,368 13,055
Note. We use the sampling weights.
Table 3.3: Parents’ net worth.
number of family net worth:
families mean standard
USD 1,000 deviation
total 6,750 237.9 510.8
giving 2,528 317.7 613.8
equal giving 115 551.8 1,076.9
Note. We use the sampling weights.
give to all, and share equally.
In Table 3.4 we switch to child level data. The idea is to get a …rst indicationif
gifts are compensatory or not. We do not know the exact income of the children,
only the income range of eachchild. As is clear from the table, children with earn-
ings above USD 10,000 get less than children with earnings below. This suggests
that gifts are compensatory. There seems, however, not to exist so big di¤erences
between the children earning USD 10,000 – 25,000 and those earning more than
USD 25,000. Children still living with their parents received considerably more
than other children.
4. Empirical evidence
This section reports our estimation results. The presentation is organised around
…ve tables. In Table 4.1 the results from a family level probit model can be found.
The dependent variable is a dummy variable for if parents give anything to any
of their children. The explanatory variables for the children are averages for all
9Table 3.4: Gifts and children’s earnings.
number of gift amounts:
children mean standard
USD deviation
children not living with their parents:
earns < USD 10,000 4,005 612 2,548
earns USD 10,000 – 25,000 6,877 377 1,901
earns > USD 25,000 8,134 384 2,220
children living with their parents 5,043 1,283 4,219
total 24,059 602 2,754
Notes. We use the sampling weights. Earnings data are not available
for children living with their parents.
children in the family while the variables for the parents are represented by the
characteristics of the main respondent. We use splines for the age and years of
education variables.
There are several important results in the table. First, parents with higher net
worth are more likely to give. Second, more children being married, on average
reduces the probability of giving. Third, the probability is decreasing in the
average age of the children while it is increasing in the average years of education.
But most of the child characteristic variables are not signi…cant. Most im-
portantly, the working hours and earnings variables, that measure the childrens
resources, are not signi…cant. Below we will return to the question if this is a
result of using family averages. Contrasting these results with estimations using
child level data shows that using family level data hides important patterns in the
data.
This estimationisbasedon6,200families. Thesefamilieshave on average three
children each. In Table 4.2 we use child level data, this gives us almost 19,000
observations. It also, however, raises the question about family speci…c e¤ects. In
general, these can be modeled as …xed e¤ects. This has, however, drawbacks in
our particular case. Only observations from families where some children receive
gifts while others do not, can be used. A …xed (family) e¤ects logit model, for
example, can only use observations where there is intrafamily variation in the
dependent variable. Hence, all observations of equal sharing would have to be
dropped.
10Table 4.1: Gift probability, probit, family level.
Child characteristics, family averages Parent characteristics, main respondent
works < 30 hours per week 0.068 (0.63) net worth 0.172 (4.46)
works ¸ 30 hours per week -0.116 (1.58) age (age < 55) 0.003 (0.54)
earns USD 10,000 – 25,000 -0.008 (0.12) age (age ¸ 55) 0.012 (1.29)
earns > USD 25,000 -0.041 (0.56) years of education ( < 11) 0.029 (1.88)
married -0.249 (3.76) years of education (11) 0.218 (4.01)
grandchildren 0.007 (0.11) years of education ( > 11) 0.081 (6.51)
age (age < 30) -0.028 (3.77) number of children 0.008 (0.92)
age (age 30 – 39) -0.019 (2.03) male -0.038 (0.58)
age (age ¸ 40) -0.131 (1.88) African American -0.355 (6.94)
years of education ( < 11) 0.111 (1.92) Hispanic -0.231 (3.19)
years of education (11) 0.146 (1.94) other non–Caucasian -0.161 (1.25)
years of education ( > 11) 0.048 (3.24) constant -1.523 (2.31)
natural child 0.008 (0.17)
lives < 10 miles from parents 0.072 (1.56)
homeowner -0.113 (1.95)
schoolchild 0.794 (8.83)




Notes. Absolute z–values in parentheses. Reference categories are “does not work at all”,
and “earns < USD 10,000”. For summary statistics, see Appendix A.
11Table 4.2: Gift probability, random e¤ects probit, child level.
Child characteristics Parent characteristics, main respondent
works < 30 hours per week 0.090 (1.31) net worth 0.322 (7.20)
works ¸ 30 hours per week -0.121 (2.52) age (age < 55) -0.004 (0.60)
earns USD 10,000 – 25,000 -0.128 (2.47) age (age ¸ 55) 0.030 (2.65)
earns > USD 25,000 -0.503 (8.40) years of education ( < 11) 0.068 (3.22)
married -0.184 (4.36) years of education (11) 0.236 (3.36)
grandchildren 0.172 (4.00) years of education ( > 11) 0.125 (8.25)
age (age < 30) -0.071 (9.79) number of children -0.174 (14.0)
age (age 30 – 39) -0.036 (4.64) male -0.199 (2.31)
age (age ¸ 40) -0.033 (1.13) African American -0.415 (6.41)
years of education ( < 11) 0.082 (2.06) Hispanic -0.288 (2.98)
years of education (11) 0.051 (0.70) other non–Caucasian -0.119 (0.72)
years of education ( > 11) 0.028 (2.41) constant -0.383 (0.67)
natural child 0.174 (3.04)
lives < 10 miles from parents 0.211 (5.66)
homeowner -0.175 (4.14)
schoolchild 0.424 (7.06)
number of children 18,980 number of families 6,151
Â2(27) 1,012.3
log likelihood -6,054.7
Notes. Absolute z–values in parentheses. Reference categories are “does not
work at all”, and “earns < USD 10,000”.
12Therefore we have, instead, relied on a random (family) e¤ects probit model.
Comparing with Table4.1it is clear that going from family level data to childlevel
data produces much richer results. Almost all estimated coe¢cients aresigni…cant
at the conventional 5 %–level.
Here we …nd, in contrast to the family level estimations reported in Table 4.1,
that the probability of giving decreases if the child works more. The table also
shows that higher earnings for the child decreases the probability of the parents
giving.
Parents are more likely to give to a child if the child has children of its own.
Moreover, a natural child is more likely to receive than, for example, a step child
or an adopted child.11 A child with more years of education, a child living close
to its parents, and a child still in school is also more likely to receive a gift. The
probability decreases if the child is married, if it is a homeowner, and it also
decreases with age.
Looking at the parents characteristics instead, we …nd that higher net worth
increases the gift probability. If parents have many children they are less likely
to give. On the other hand, the gift probability is increasing in the age and the
years of education of the parents.
Theremainingthreetables havethe amounts receivedby childrenasdependent
variable. The predictions of the theoretical models reviewed in section 2 have
more to do with gift amounts than gift probabilities. The results in the tables
that followare, therefore, closer totest of the predictions ofthe theoretical models
than the estimated models for gift probabilities. In Table 4.3 we report estimates
of a model with…xed family e¤ects. Only childrenfrom families where the parents
have made gifts to at least one of the children, but not necessarily to each child,
are included.
This leaves us with 2,200 families and almost 6,400 children. When the family
e¤ects are modeled as …xed, only the child characteristics can be included among
the explanatory variables. The estimation results are similar to those reported for
the gift probabilities. Working more, and earning more reduce the gift amount
received. This is consistent with gifts being compensatory. Being married, being
a homeowner, and age also reduces the amount received.
Having children, being a natural child, living close to the parents, and being a
schoolchild increase the amounts that parents give. It is interesting to note that
the years of education variables are not signi…cant in this estimation, in contrast
to the previous.
In Table 4.4 we repeat the analysis including random family e¤ects instead
of …xed. The estimated e¤ects of child characteristics are similar to those of the
…xed family e¤ects model.
11We have de…ned a natural child as being natural to both partners in the surveyd household.
13Table 4.3: Gift amounts, …xed e¤ects model, conditional on positive family
amounts, child level.
Child characteristics
works < 30 hours per week 0.233 (1.05)
works ¸ 30 hours per week -0.335 (2.23)
earns USD 10,000 – 25,000 -0.635 (3.67)
earns > USD 25,000 -1.780 (9.29)
married -0.365 (2.82)
grandchildren 0.559 (4.32)
age (age < 30) -0.162 (6.99)
age (age 30 – 39) -0.109 (4.69)
age (age ¸ 40) -0.026 (0.39)
years of education ( < 11) 0.129 (1.01)
years of education (11) 0.080 (0.34)
years of education ( > 11) -0.003 (0.09)
natural child 1.373 (3.76)




number of children 6,390




Notes. The dependent variable is log (amount in USD + 1).
Absolute t–values in parentheses. Reference categories are
“does not work at all”, and “earns < USD 10,000”.
14Table 4.4: Gifts amounts, random e¤ects model, conditional on positive family
amounts, child level.
Child characteristics Parent characteristics, main respondent
works < 30 hours per week 0.285 (1.62) net worth 0.582 (7.25)
works ¸ 30 hours per week -0.300 (2.49) age (age < 55) 0.013 (0.98)
earns USD 10,000 – 25,000 -0.451 (3.38) age (age ¸ 55) 0.079 (3.42)
earns > USD 25,000 -1.256 (8.65) years of education ( < 11) 0.107 (2.25)
married -0.349 (3.36) years of education (11) -0.265 (1.76)
grandchildren 0.423 (4.04) years of education ( > 11) 0.065 (2.32)
age (age < 30) -0.171 (9.52) number of children -0.434 (20.1)
age (age 30 – 39) -0.060 (3.26) male -0.528 (2.97)
age (age ¸ 40) -0.065 (1.17) African American -0.350 (2.56)
years of education ( < 11) 0.071 (0.70) Hispanic -0.290 (1.42)
years of education (11) 0.070 (0.38) other non–Caucasian -0.316 (0.92)
years of education ( > 11) 0.036 (1.33) constant 7.559 (5.76)
natural child 0.289 (2.53)
lives < 10 miles from parents 0.491 (5.50)
homeowner -0.263 (2.61)
schoolchild 0.697 (4.76)





Notes. The dependent variable is log (amount in USD + 1).
Absolute t–values in parentheses. Reference categories are “does not work at all”,
and “earns < USD 10,000”. Parents’ net worth measured in million USD.
15In this case, we can also include parent characteristics. Higher net worth in-
creases the amount that the parents give to a child. The amount is also increasing
in the age and the years of education of the parent. More children, on the other
hand, reduces the amount given to each child.
Finally, we have estimated a …xed family e¤ects Tobit model for the gift
amounts using the approach of Honoré (1992). Now we can also include children
from families where there are no gifts. The sample increases to 3,100 families and
11,200 children.
The estimator was developedfor “regular” panel data withtwo “time periods”
(inour case two children) per family. Since our sample includes families with more
thantwochildren(unbalancedpanel dataset), weconsiderall paired combinations
of children within a family. Estimating onall perceivable combinations of children
yields asetof estimates which will di¤er, but can be linkedby aminimum distance
criterion using appropriate moment conditions.
In order to form pairwise combinations of children, one needs to know which
children to compare—some order is needed (in traditional panels this is clear). In
our case, we order children according to age. The convergence of the estimator
is sensitive to the amount of censoring. We had to disregard all pairwise com-
binations of children where more than 90 % of the observations were censored
(zero). Also, we disregarded all combinations of kids with comprising less than
100 households in order to have identi…cation.
Table 4.5 reports the results. Once more, we obtain results consistent with
parents having a compensatory gift behavior. If the child works more or earns
more the gift amount will be reduced.
Havingchildrenandbeinganatural child(borderline)increase the giftamounts.
For these under the age of 40, the gift amount is decreasing in age. For most of the
other variables, the signs of the estimated coe¢cients remain the same compared
to Tables 4.3 and Table 4.4, but the t–statistics are lower here.
As there is no information on the earnings of children living at home with
their parents, there are families in our sample where only some of the children are
included in the estimations. In order to check if the results are sensitive to this
we have also estimated using a subsample with families with only adult children.
Appendix B reports these estimations. The general pattern of results stay the
same using this subsample. Most importantly, gift amounts and gift probabilities
remain compensatory.
5. Concluding remarks
Empirical studies of intergenerational transfers usually …nd that bequests are
equally divided among heirs while inter vivos gifts tend to be compensatory.
16Table 4.5: Gift amounts, …xed e¤ects Tobit, child level.
Child characteristics
works < 30 hours per week -0.593 (0.77)
works ¸ 30 hours per week -1.238 (2.46)
earns USD 10,000 – 25,000 -1.008 (1.83)
earns > USD 25,000 -2.940 (4.71)
married -0.661 (1.53)
grandchildren 1.010 (2.32)
age (age < 30) -0.275 (3.03)
age (age 30 – 39) -0.186 (2.29)
age (age ¸ 40) 0.107 (1.13)
years of education ( < 11) 0.357 (1.48)
years of education (11) -0.825 (0.74)
years of education ( > 11) -0.203 (1.41)
natural child 2.870 (1.94)
lives < 10 miles from parents 0.818 (1.80)
homeowner -0.716 (1.61)
schoolchild 0.656 (1.12)
number of children 11,212
number of families 3,129
Notes. The dependent variable is log (amount in USD + 1).
The table reports …nal estimates from unbalanced Honoré
LS [MDE]. Absolute t–values in parentheses.
Children are ordered according to age.
Reference categories are “does not work at all”,
and “earns < USD 10,000”.
17Using the HRS data set from the U.S. we …nd that only 5 % of parents who give,
divide their gifts equally among their children. Estimating probit models, using
family panels, we …nd that gifts are compensatory in the sense that a child is more
likely to receive a gift if she works fewer hours and has lower income than than
her brothers and sisters.
These results carry over to the amounts given. Estimations of …xed and ran-
dom e¤ects models, conditional on positive family gift amounts, and …xed e¤ect
Tobit estimations show that the fewer hours a child works and the lower her
income is, the more the parents give.
The empirical …ndings suggest that gifts are compensatory. This is consistent
with the predictions of the altruistic model of intergenerational transfers.
18A. Appendix. Sample statistics and variable de…nitions
The sample statistics for the children can be found Table A.1. The columns to
the left report sample statistics for the individuals while the columns to the right
concern the sample statistics of the means of the children in each family.
Table A.2 report the sample statistics for the parent who is the main respon-
dent.
19Table A.1: Sample statistics, children.
individuals: family means:
variable obs mean s d min max obs mean s d min max
gift received 24,059 .158 6,750 .204 .321 0 1
gift amount, USD 24,059 511 2,451 0 80,000 6,750 721 2,606 0 80,000
does not work at all 22,473 .211 6,613 .205 .278 0 1
works < 30 h per week 22,473 .095 6,613 .103 .210 0 1
works ¸ 30 h per week 22,473 .694 6,613 .693 .320 0 1
earns < USD 10,000 19,016 .211 6,157 .194 .308 0 1
earns USD 10,000-25,000 19,016 .362 6,157 .358 .365 0 1
earns > USD 25,000 19,016 .428 6,157 .447 .403 0 1
married 22,475 .531 6,613 .512 .350 0 1
grandchildren 22,475 .583 6,613 .540 .360 0 1
age 24,059 28.8 7.14 1 60 6,750 28.6 5.86 1 54.7
years of education 22,440 12.8 2.22 1 17 6,611 13.1 1.84 2.33 17
natural child 24,059 .733 6,750 .791 .384 0 1
lives < 10 m from parents 19,015 .405 6,157 .407 .384 0 1
homeowner 19,947 .416 6,267 .416 .370 0 1
schoolchild 22,475 .119 6,613 .140 .261 0 1
Table A.2: Sample statistics, parents.
main respondent:
variable n of obs mean s d min max
gift made 6,750 .375
gift amount, USD 6,750 1,821 6,000 0 240,000
net worth, USD 1,000 6,750 211 477 -745 8,735
age 6,749 53.8 5.31 23 72
years of education 6,750 11.9 3.02 0 17
number of children 6,750 3.56 2.03 1 19
male 6,750 .079
African American 6,750 .187
Hispanic 6,750 .095
other non–Caucasian 6,750 .020
20B. Appendix. Subsample: Families with adult children only
This appendix reports estimations using the same speci…cation as in Section 4
but restricting the sample to families with adult children only. This reduces
the sample from 6,750 families with 24,059 children to 2,905 families with 9,098
children. The qualitative results remain the same in general. Most importantly
gifts are compensatory also in this restricted sample.
21Table B.1: Gift probability, probit, family level.
Child characteristics, family averages Parent characteristics, main respondent
works < 30 hours per week 0.268 (1.52) net worth 0.186 (3.47)
works ¸ 30 hours per week 0.127 (1.17) age (age < 55) -0.001 (0.13)
earns USD 10,000 – 25,000 -0.015 (0.13) age (age ¸ 55) 0.002 (0.20)
earns > USD 25,000 -0.191 (1.57) years of education ( < 11) 0.043 (1.61)
married -0.156 (1.72) years of education (11) 0.166 (2.04)
grandchildren 0.145 (1.54) years of education ( > 11) 0.107 (5.78)
age (age < 30) -0.034 (2.11) number of children 0.004 (0.28)
age (age 30 – 39) -0.003 (0.27) male -0.243 (2.50)
age (age ¸ 40) -0.158 (1.96) African American -0.344 (4.22)
years of education ( < 11) 0.156 (1.61) Hispanic -0.196 (1.48)
years of education (11) 0.251 (2.24) other non–Caucasian -0.024 (0.11)
years of education ( > 11) 0.007 (0.24) constant -2.020 (1.67)
natural child 0.054 (0.75)
lives < 10 miles from parents 0.135 (1.89)
homeowner -0.278 (3.21)




Notes. Absolute z–values in parentheses. Reference categories are “does not work at all”,
and “earns < USD 10,000”.
22Table B.2: Gift probability, random e¤ects probit, child level.
Child characteristics Parent characteristics, main respondent
works < 30 hours per week 0.016 (0.15) net worth 0.346 (5.61)
works ¸ 30 hours per week -0.090 (1.25) age (age < 55) -0.001 (0.12)
earns USD 10,000 – 25,000 -0.078 (0.97) age (age ¸ 55) 0.020 (1.26)
earns > USD 25,000 -0.448 (4.98) years of education ( < 11) 0.085 (2.40)
married -0.159 (2.63) years of education (11) 0.216 (2.06)
grandchildren 0.177 (2.86) years of education ( > 11) 0.152 (6.71)
age (age < 30) -0.050 (4.33) number of children -0.206 (9.75)
age (age 30 – 39) -0.042 (4.02) male -0.330 (2.70)
age (age ¸ 40) -0.026 (0.74) African American -0.355 (3.54)
years of education ( < 11) 0.114 (1.70) Hispanic -0.178 (1.05)
years of education (11) 0.077 (0.72) other non–Caucasian 0.031 (0.11)
years of education ( > 11) -0.001 (0.11) constant -1.573 (1.50)
natural child 0.165 (1.95)
lives < 10 miles from parents 0.245 (4.56)
homeowner -0.233 (3.92)
number of children 9,086 number of families 2,903
Â2(27) 407.5
log likelihood -2,978.3
Notes. Absolute z–values in parentheses. Reference categories are “does not
work at all”, and “earns < USD 10,000”.
23Table B.3: Gift amounts, …xed e¤ects model, conditional on positive family
amounts, child level.
Child characteristics
works < 30 hours per week -0.207 (0.51)
works ¸ 30 hours per week -0.464 (1.73)
earns USD 10,000 – 25,000 -0.489 (1.55)
earns > USD 25,000 -1.729 (4.98)
married -0.368 (1.68)
grandchildren 0.506 (2.32)
age (age < 30) -0.154 (3.44)
age (age 30 – 39) -0.141 (3.82)
age (age ¸ 40) -0.000 (0.01)
years of education ( < 11) -0.149 (0.50)
years of education (11) 0.509 (1.21)
years of education ( > 11) -0.036 (0.53)
natural child 1.398 (2.26)
lives < 10 miles from parents 0.833 (4.07)
homeowner -0.573 (2.72)
constant 9.722 (2.86)
number of children 2,608




Notes. The dependent variable is log (amount in USD + 1).
Absolute t–values in parentheses. Reference categories are
“does not work at all”, and “earns < USD 10,000”.
24Table B.4: Gifts amounts, random e¤ects model, conditional on positive family
amounts, child level.
Child characteristics Parent characteristics, main respondent
works < 30 hours per week -0.006 (0.02) net worth 0.564 (5.59)
works ¸ 30 hours per week -0.270 (1.32) age (age < 55) 0.008 (0.30)
earns USD 10,000 – 25,000 -0.332 (1.43) age (age ¸ 55) 0.077 (2.37)
earns > USD 25,000 -1.093 (4.43) years of education ( < 11) 0.193 (2.11)
married -0.347 (2.10) years of education (11) -0.486 (2.06)
grandchildren 0.434 (2.56) years of education ( > 11) 0.085 (1.99)
age (age < 30) -0.127 (3.84) number of children -0.597 (14.8)
age (age 30 – 39) -0.124 (4.55) male -0.445 (1.65)
age (age ¸ 40) -0.028 (0.35) African American -0.121 (0.53)
years of education ( < 11) -0.042 (0.18) Hispanic 0.139 (0.36)
years of education (11) 0.226 (0.71) other non–Caucasian -0.390 (0.63)
years of education ( > 11) 0.036 (0.85) constant 7.841 (2.61)
natural child 0.365 (2.07)
lives < 10 miles from parents 0.589 (4.17)
homeowner -0.235 (1.49)





Notes. The dependent variable is log (amount in USD + 1).
Absolute t–values in parentheses. Reference categories are “does not work at all”,
and “earns < USD 10,000”. Parents’ net worth measured in million USD.
25Table B.5: Gift amounts, …xed e¤ects Tobit, child level.
Child characteristics
works < 30 hours per week -0.950 (1.08)
works ¸ 30 hours per week -1.310 (2.08)
earns USD 10,000 – 25,000 -1.392 (2.05)
earns > USD 25,000 -3.168 (4.04)
married -0.649 (1.33)
grandchildren 1.060 (1.95)
age (age < 30) -0.235 (1.99)
age (age 30 – 39) -0.247 (3.18)
age (age ¸ 40) 0.224 (1.67)
years of education ( < 11) -0.210 (0.60)
years of education (11) 0.353 (0.26)
years of education ( > 11) -0.197 (0.99)
natural child 3.080 (2.82)
lives < 10 miles from parents 1.242 (2.54)
homeowner -0.845 (1.71)
number of children 8,665
number of families 2,500
Notes. The dependent variable is log (amount in USD + 1).
The table reports …nal estimates from unbalanced Honoré
LS [MDE]. Absolute t–values in parentheses.
Children are ordered according to age.
Reference categories are “does not work at all”,
and “earns < USD 10,000”.
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